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On Γίγνων:

Διἀνοια και Ἀγάλματα as seen in Birth and Line Metaphors
“…γένοι, ὸιος ἐστί μαθών.”1 The seventy-second line in Pindar’s second Pythian Ode,
the enigmatic “Become as you are, having learned such a thing.” There exists about the
enigmatic statement a certain sense of “self-birth” that is necessary for one to undergo. This short
line from Pindar is not the only instance of becoming in the Greek world; a similar line was
inscribed as one of the Delphic imperatives, “know thyself”.
It is no surprise, then, to see that the Platonic dialogues are also instantiated with the idea
of “becoming”, γίγνομαι in the Greek. Just as γίγνομαι was a verb with a variety of meanings, so
too is the idea of “becoming” in the Platonic dialogues. This idea of becoming ranges from the
theory of recollection, as described most specifically in the Meno, to the use of birth metaphors
as found in the Theaetetus and the Phaedrus.
In his book, Blindness and Reorientation, philosopher C.D.C Reeve introduced another
dialogue which makes use of the birth metaphor, the Symposium. And although this is in no way
unusual or unexpected, the language of the birth metaphor differs sharply from that found in the
Theaetetus, with few of the same words being used in birth metaphor as in the other. Indeed, the
birth metaphors of the Theaetetus and the Symposium, as Reeve found it, are so different, they
appear to be metaphors for two different kinds of birth. This idea of difference is supported in the
fact that the “offspring” in the two dialogues is represented by two completely different words:
in the Symposium, it is ἀγάλματα2, whereas in the Theaetetus, it is διάνοια.
This paper will examine C.D.C Reeve’s use of ἀγάλματα as a birth metaphor in the
dialogue the Symposium, and compare it to the other birth metaphors as found in the Theaetetus.
This paper posits that there is a difference betwixt the ἀγάλματα found in Socrates and the
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διάνοια with which certain men are found to be pregnant3. The relationship of ἀγάλματα and
διάνοια are commensurate to the relationship of διάνοια and νοήσις as found in the hierarchy of
understanding in the soul in the line metaphor of the Republic.
The paper will seek to prove this thesis by means of close philological and philosophical
examination of the selection and use of words chosen in birth metaphors in the dialogues of first
the Theaetetus, then in the Symposium.4 Having established the difference and connection of the
birth metaphors in the prior dialogues, the paper will then move into a comparison of the birth
metaphors to the line metaphor in the Republic.
The Theaetetus, Ἤ Διάνοια
Let us begin with an examination of the Theaetetus, the dialogue in which the birth
metaphor is most obvious. It is in this dialogue that Socrates openly aligns himself with the
midwife, stating not only that he is the son of the “noble and burly” midwife Phaenarete5, but
also that he himself practices the art of midwifery. “Now my art of midwifery is just like theirs in
most respects. The difference is that I attend men and not women, and that I watch over the labor
of their souls, not of their bodies.”6
This is the most open of the metaphors, a mere surface analogy for the understanding of
Theaetetus. The metaphor deepens as Socrates continues to state, “the most important thing
about my art is the ability to apply all possible tests to the offspring, to determine whether the
young mind is being delivered of a phantom, that is, an error, or a fertile truth.”7 This is Levett’s
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translation, but Fowler’s translation of the passage describes that which is brought forth either as
a phantom, or as “a real and genuine offspring.”8
Upon examining the Greek, one finds that the word which both Levett and Fowler
translate as “real offspring” is in fact not the Greek for offspring at all. At no time in the dialogue
is the word παῖς used, the common word for “child” in Greek. At select times in the dialogue9 is
ἔκγονος used, an adjective taking the genitive which means “born of, sprung from”, or used
substantively as a noun meaning “child”.
The word chosen by Plato, instead, to describe the “genuine offspring” or the “real truth”
is the word διάνοια. This word in fact has no connotation of child or birth at all in the Greek
lexicon; Liddle and Scott define διάνοια as a “thought, a purpose, an intelligence, an
understanding”. And yet one cannot fault either translator; the metaphor of the midwife and the
very verbiage of the sentence—the verb is ἀποτίκτω, to bring forth, to bring forth into the
world—ensure that the connotation of διάνοια is that of “offspring”.
Through this examination, it becomes clear that that to which men give birth is ἥ διάνοια
ἤ γόνιμόν τε καί ἀληθές—an offspring which is both true and genuine. This διάνοια is something
ἔκγονος τῆς ψυχῆς, that is, born from the soul. That which Socrates delivers of pregnant men is
therefore some sort of understanding or intelligence that is born directly from the soul, as
opposed to that which is εἴδωλον καὶ ψεῦδος, a “phantom” and “false”. The grammar of the
sentence opposes the two nouns, the understanding and the phantom, and their following
descriptors, real and false respectively. Through this language, it was manifest that this is a birth
metaphor for διάνοια in the Platonic dialogues. It is not the body of the man who is pregnant so
much as it is his soul; but as the soul is encapsulated in the body, physical words of birth must be
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used to describe the birth of ideas—of διάνοια—in the soul. This διάνοια, being both real and
true, is therefore linked to knowledge.
Reeve’s Symposium, Τ’ Ἀγάλματα
In chapter two of Blindness and Reorientation, philosopher C.D.C Reeve introduces
another birth metaphor, the likes of which previously not seen in previous readings of the
Symposium: the use of the word ἀγάλματα. He does not pay attention to the very clear birth
metaphor given by Socrates in the Symposium10, but rather suggests that ἀγάλματα is a birth
metaphor for Socrates himself.
The word is first used when Alcibiades enters the feast in the Symposium, upon which
entrance he declares “ Socrates is most like those silenuses sitting in the statuary shops, the ones
the craftsmen manufacture, with pipes and flutes, but when opened in the middle, they turn out to
have ἀγάλματα of the gods inside them” (215a7-b3).11
The simile is rather an odd one, as there is no clear idea about the nature of a “silenus”, as
there are no longer any ones extant.12 What is clear enough to conclude, however, is that “as a
silenus contained statues of the gods, so Socrates, too, contained things relevantly similar to
them.”13
Having discussed the somewhat puzzling nature of the silenus, Reeve explores the use of
the word ἀγάλματα, first giving the standard definition, “typically a figurative statue in honor of
a god or—and more often in Plato—a figurative statue of any sort: the puppets that cast their
shadows on the walls of the cave are ἀγάλματα (R.7, 517d7).14
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Reeve returns to an analysis of the Symposium text, and it is revealed that these ἀγάλματα
found in Socrates are “ἀγάλματα of virtue, and that they have the greatest reach—or rather, that
they extend to everything that is appropriate for a man who intends to be fine and good to
consider.” (221e1-222a6)15
From this conclusion, that ἀγάλματα are “ἀγάλματα of virtue”16, he draws another: that
the ἀγάλματα are themselves to be seen as embryo-like entities”.17 He draws this conclusion
from the verb choice of Alcibiades to describe Socrates, that he “teems” (216d7), the translation
of γέμω. Γέμω is a verb which typically means “to be full” or “to be filled with”18, and Reeve
links this meaning to the verb κύω, the verb “to conceive” or “to be pregnant with”.
From this series of word choices and definitions, Reeve concludes that it is a portrayal of
Socrates “as a male pregnant with embryonic virtue”19. He solidifies this idea first by aligning it
with “deep roots in Greek thinking about sexual reproduction”, that the “female serves only as an
incubator from an embryo produced exclusively by a male”.20 He also aligns this idea of male
reproduction with Diotima, “when she portrays reproduction as involving pregnant males
seeking females in whom to beget”.21
There is a twofold problem, however, which arises out of Reeve’s connotative translation
and understanding of ἀγάλματα as a birth metaphor, and Socrates as a “pregnant male figure” in
the Symposium. The first of these two problems centers on the Theaetetus. Reeve focuses on the
Phaedrus and the Alcibiades, as well as the Symposium, to illustrate the idea that ἀγάλματα is
“embryonic virtue” with which Socrates is pregnant. There is no mention of the Theaetetus, and
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if this is indeed a metaphor, as Reeve suggests, there is little explanation as to why there is no
mention of the Theaetetus in his discussion. This is remarkably odd, in that the Theaetetus is the
dialogue in which there is heavy use of the birth metaphor, as discussed above.
Moreover, Socrates states openly in the Theaetetus that midwives are those who have had
children, as “human nature is too weak to acquire skill where it has no experience.”22 At the
same time, those who are midwives must be “past child-bearing” as “women never practice as
midwives while they are still conceiving and bearing children themselves.”23 By aligning himself
with the midwife and declaring his difference from them to be those whom he practices upon—
men—and of what he delivers them—either phantoms or διάνοια—it is clear that Socrates at one
time gave birth to his own διάνοια, but is past that “child-bearing” age, as he now acts as a
midwife for other pregnant men.
This fact appears to go directly against the suggestion of Reeve that Socrates is a figure
of a “male pregnant with embryonic virtue”, if his understanding of ἀγάλματα is correct. In fact,
the Theaetetus makes quite the opposite point—that Socrates, while perhaps pregnant once, is no
longer so. This troubles the Reeve understanding of ἀγάλματα quite seriously, for how could
Socrates be pregnant with “embryonic virtue” while it is quite clearly stated that he can no longer
give birth? If Reeve’s understanding of ἀγάλματα is correct, it would seem that either it or
Socrates is impotent—both of which solutions seem ludicrous. How could “embryonic virtue” be
impotent; how could the “wisest man” as proclaimed by the Delphic oracle, be impotent?
Furthermore, ἀγάλματα is never found in the Theaetetus; Plato uses διάνοια as the ἔκγονος of
men’s souls.
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There is a further—and perhaps more troubling—difficulty to Reeve’s understanding of
ἀγάλματα as “embryonic virtue” in a pregnant Socrates. The word “ἀγάλματα” means “a statue
in honor of a god”, with the specific meaning in Plato of “any figurative statue”.24 Reeve kept
that sense of the word in his choice translation of “embryo” which he states as “genuinely similar
to figurative statues”.25 What Reeve does not resolve so readily or persuasively is the use of the
exact same word, ἀγάλματα, in the Republic’s metaphor of the cave.26 Although he does indeed
mention the usage, he resolves this simply it is this meaning of the word which “Alcibiades
initially seems to have in mind”.
Reeve continues on to clarify the meaning of ἀγάλματα, but without exact or final
resolution of this problem. It has been proved in the Theaetetus that Plato chooses his words with
and for a definitive cause. Ergo, it throws into doubt that Plato could use at the same time
ἀγάλματα to mean both “puppets” and “shadows” in the Republic and “embryonic virtue” as a
birth metaphor in the Symposium. It is hard to believe that Socrates could be aligned with the
things which cast shadows, as he is both a midwife of souls27 and the “kind of gadfly” on the
“great and noble horse”28 of Athens, and of whom the Delphic oracle said “that no one was
wiser.”29
And yet although a close reading of the Theaetetus in light of Reeve’s suggestion of
ἀγάλματα produces conflict, a closer reading reveals resolution, both for the problems found in
the text of the Theaetetus itself and with the problems in Reeve’s suggestion as discussed above.
Let us return to the section of the Theaetetus which was so troublesome for both the
Theaetetus and Reeve’s birth metaphor. In the Theaetetus, Socrates states, “For one thing which
24
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I have in common with the ordinary midwives is that I myself am barren of wisdom.”30 “The
God…has forbidden me to procreate…I cannot claim as the child of my own soul any discovery
worth the name of wisdom.”31 This appears to make it clear that Socrates has never had any
διάνοια of his own, as the God has forbidden him procreation. And yet at the same time, as
midwife to those men who are allowed to procreate, Socrates must have at one time given birth
to such an offspring of understanding. For he also states that the duties of midwifery cannot be
entrusted to anyone who has not experience what it is like to give birth, as “human nature is too
weak to acquire skill where it has no experience.”32
The paper questioned how this could be, as Socrates states two direct contraries within
thirty lines of each other. The paper also questions how he could have ἀγάλματα, when it is
nowhere mentioned in the Theaetetus. Perhaps both these questions can be answered in an
understanding that, while both words belong to birth metaphors, there are two different levels to
the kind of understanding that comes from the soul.
On διάνοια and ἀγάλματα
The idea that διάνοια and ἀγάλματα are two different instantiations of that which can be
ἔκγονος τῆς ψυχῆς is a solution, in fact, readily acceptable. For if one accepts that both of these
things can be born from the soul, the problems in both the Theaetetus and with Reeve’s
suggested birth metaphor are solved.
It is very clear in the Theaetetus that Socrates is no longer able to give birth to διάνοια;
indeed, that he does not have “any wise invention, the offspring born of [his] own soul.”33 That is
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it say, he can no longer have any διάνοια; he has not had διάνοια ἔκγονος τῆς ψυχῆς. But he must
have had some sort of understanding at one point, otherwise he could not act as a midwife.
It is at this point the Reeve suggestion of ἀγάλματα is introduced. Before the introduction
of this suggested birth metaphor as Socrates pregnant with ἀγάλματα, one reads the Theaetetus
with ἥ διάνοια as the sole genuine and true thing which can be born of the soul. If Reeve is
correct and ἀγάλματα can be in be connotatively read as “embryonic virtue”, this is a new
genuine and true thing which can be born of the soul. Moreover, ἀγάλματα carry a more
advanced dimension than διάνοια, as Plato describes these things as “the greatest importance for
anyone who wants to become a truly good man.”34 There is no such qualitative value given to
διάνοια, although the understanding born of the soul is most definitely a valuable thing. This
value is given in the Symposium, where the same birth metaphor language to describe διάνοια is
used to describe what a man must do in order to commune with Beauty.35
When these two dialogues and their respective birth metaphors are read together, it seems
very likely possible that one must first give birth to διάνοια, and then, once having given birth to
such an understanding in the soul, one can nurture it as though “he nurtures the newborn”36 to
this new level of understanding, this “embryonic virtue” that Socrates has within him as though
her were a silenus, this ἀγάλματα. In short, ἀγάλματα is the advanced stage of διάνοια. Socrates
has given birth to διάνοια, enabling him to be a midwife to those men with pregnant souls, but he
can no longer give birth to such offspring because his soul is now nurturing ἀγάλματα.
This idea that ἀγάλματα ἔκγονος τῆς ψυχῆς is a more advanced state of διάνοια is
supported not only in the readings of the Theaetetus and the Symposium, but also in the very
etymology of the word itself. In the fifth and fourth centuries, there was movement in Greek
3434
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culture termed “presentification”, “the making present of the invisible to the imitation of
appearance.”37 It is in this age that ἀγάλματα came into their own, as it were. One must note the
dictionary definition of ἀγάλματα, “an honorific statue of a god”. The aim of these statues was to
“establish a true communication, and authentic contact” with the god they represented.38 The
ἀγάλματα were much more than simple statues, mimetic representations, but rather they were an
“attempt to construct a bridge…that will reach toward the divine.”39 It must “participate
intimately with the divine, and yet by the same move, it must also emphasize what is inaccessible
and mysterious in divinity, its alien quality, its otherness.”40 Perhaps most importantly, the
ἀγάλματα had to “stress the incommensurability between the sacred power and everything that
reveals it to the eyes of mortals in what can only be an inadequate and incomplete way.”41
This reading of ἀγάλματα manifests the idea that one’s soul must first undergo the
conceiving and delivery of διάνοια—which is an understanding born of the soul, integral to the
journey of philosophers to commune with the forms, as made clear in Diotima’s speech in the
Symposium. But ἥ διἀνοια is not the last step in the philosopher’s journey to know the forms;
elsewise Socrates would never have stopped giving birth to his metaphorical offspring. Instead,
one must nurture the διάνοια into ἀγάλματα, which are bridges to know the forms.
The Republic: διάνοια and ἀγάλματα as commensurate to the line metaphor
The idea that the soul must conceive and bear forth διάνοια, and from that birth of
understanding the soul might nurture Reeve’s ἀγάλματα, that embryonic virtue which Socrates
has in his soul, which act as bridges to the forms—this is not an unfamiliar division. This idea of
a further development of διάνοια is found not only in the birth metaphors of the Theaetetus and
37
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of the Symposium, but also in the Republic. These instantiations of two kind of understanding
ἔκγονος τῆς ψυχῆς are manifest not in birth metaphors of the Republic—the cave metaphor may
be taken as a birth metaphor—but most specifically in the metaphor of the line, which Plato
gives in Book VI.
In the line metaphor,42 Socrates distinguishes two realms, the “visible” and the
“intelligible”.43 The visible section of the line consists of “shadows, then reflections in bodies of
water and in…shiny materials.”44 The “other subsection of the visible” consists of “the originals
of these images.”45 The original Greek differentiates these subsections as εἰκασίαν and πίστιν46,
respectively. The former means “image” or “conjecture”; the latter, “belief”.
The next section of the line Socrates classed as the “intelligible”, and he divides it into
the subsections of διάνοια, and νοήσιν. These subsections are not nearly so easy to explain, as
they belong to a realm which one can only know, and not see.
In one subsection, the soul, using as images the things that were imitated before, is
compelled to base its inquiry on hypotheses, proceeding not to a first principle, but to a
conclusion. In the other subsection, by contrast, it makes its way to an unhypothetical
first principle, proceeding from a hypothesis, but without the images used in the previous
subsection, using the forms themselves and making its methodical inquiry through
them.47
The latter subsection of the soul in the intelligible realm is διάνοια; the former is νοήσις.
Διάνοια is further explained through the practice of geometry, that geometers “use visible forms
and make their arguments about them, although they are not thinking about them, but about those
others things that they are like? They make their arguments with a view to the square itself and
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the diagonal itself, not the diagonal they draw…”48 The soul who has reached the stage of
διάνοια is able to “use images in seeking those other things themselves that one cannot see
except by means of thought.”49 The thoughts which are turned out as result by these imageassisted inquiries are called “hypotheses”—a genuine and true understanding born of the soul. A
διάνοια.
It is from these hypotheses that one can proceed, insofar as the soul “makes its way to an
unhypothtical first principle.”50 This νοήσις in the soul “requires no assumption and is the
starting-point of all….making no use of whatever of any object of sense, but only of pure ideas
moving on through ideas and ending with ideas.”51 The translation provided by C.D.C Reeve is
slightly more provocative: “making no use of anything visible at all, but only of forms
themselves, moving on through forms to forms, and ending in forms.”52 An examination of the
Greek reveals that what Reeve translates as “form” and Shorey as “idea” is in fact ἔιδος.
Regardless of the translation choice, what must be grasped from this section of the Republic is
that it is only through νοήσις that the soul might achieve communion with that which Plato calls
ἔιδος.
One cannot ignore the appearance of διάνοια in both the line metaphor and the birth
metaphors of the Theaetetus and Symposium, especially as Plato is known as a calculating
wordsmith. It would be possible, perhaps, to explain away the parallelism as a mere coincidence
if not for the fact that, in both metaphors, διάνοια has the same nature and function. The nature
of διάνοια in the line metaphor is as an understanding, “something intermediate between opinion
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and reason.”53 That is, διάνοια falls in between νοήσις and πίστις, between reason and the
originals of images. In the combined birth metaphors of the Theaetetus and the Symposium— as
shown by Reeve— διάνοια is the stage above εἴδωλον—a phantom or imposter—and the stage
prior to νοήσις , a stage in which the soul has within it “embryonic virtue”, ἀγάλματα, the
bridges that connect the embodied soul to the realm of the forms. Having ascended to this stage
in his soul, Socrates cannot descend back into the state of giving birth to διάνοια, and this
statement is supported by his belief that, when knowing the Good, one cannot do something
which is not in accordance with it—a phenomenon also known as akrasia.
Up to this point, the paper has addressed these two metaphors as separate, as parallel
lines. But in the prior analysis, it is clear that the line metaphor and its subsections of πίστις,
διάνοια, and νοήσις conveys the exact same divisions of understanding in the soul as does the
combined birth metaphor. Διάνοια has the same function in both metaphors. Ἀγάλματα aligns
with νοήσις in that, when the soul has understanding, it is able to know and connect with—as
much as an embodied soul is able—the forms. The bridge by which this understanding54 is
connected to the forms is by the ἀγάλματα which reside in the soul.
It is not impossible to see that these metaphors are metaphors for the same thing—the
steps through which one must go to achieve knowledge of and communion with the forms.
Moreover, the idea that there are many metaphors for one idea—if one will allow the word—is
an idea frequently found in Plato. To understand this, one must look and the nature and function
of the metaphor in the Platonic dialogue.
For Plato, metaphors have a twofold purpose: the first is that a metaphor acts as a noble
lie for the ὅι πόλλοι, the men who do not have philosophic souls and therefore will never see for

53
54

Republic 511d3-d4
Be careful here that it is the understanding of νοήσις and not the understanding διάνοια

themselves the things which the metaphors represent. The metaphor is a noble lie in that there is
no actual line as given in Book VI of the Republic, but the line does make some aspect of the
truth which the metaphor represents accessible to those men whose souls are not of philosophic
bent. In short, there is no line of the intelligible and the visible, but there is a realm of the
intelligible and the forms.
The second purpose of the metaphor is to void the pitfalls of writing which Plato outlines
in the Phaedrus.55 This purpose of the metaphor is seen in the nature of the birth metaphor. This
birth metaphor is not a physical metaphor, as is the line analogy, but rather it is a verbal
metaphor, in that Plato uses words concerning conception and birth to avoid objective writing.
Objective writing is condemned in Plato because, among other things, it “reach[es]
indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have no business with it, and it
doesn’t know to whom it should speak and to whom it should not.”56 By using such a method as
the birth metaphor, Plato avoids such a problem. The birth metaphor acts as “a discourse that is
written down, with knowledge, in the soul of the listener…”57Unlike objective, directive
writing—which is didactic and simply tells the external mind what is and what it not, the use of
metaphors in the Platonic dialogues requires one to think, so that the idea conveyed by the
metaphor is reached—by dialect and by personal thought and inquiry—between mind and mind,
between soul and soul. This applies not only towards one man to another, but also from one man
to himself. A metaphor is not only for inducing a reader into the laborious process of conceiving
διάνοια—so that they might eventually come to a point of νοήσις, where their souls will nourish
ἀγάλματα of the forms—but also for reminding the philosopher “when he reaches old forgetful
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age”; “it is likely he will sow gardens of letters for the sake of amusing himself, storing up
reminders for himself…”58 Writing must be done in metaphors for this reason, and even then, “at
their very best, these can only serve as reminders to those who already know.”59
The διάνοια which is so essential to the soul cannot be sparked by objective writing, for
writing is an image, essentially. Just as the geometer no longer looks to drawings of the squares
but to the square itself, so must the reader of the Platonic dialogue look beyond the literal words
of the metaphor, and to that which the metaphor represents, which “one cannot see except by
means of thought.”60 This idea is further supported in the Phaedrus, where Socrates states:
The dialectician…plants and sows within [the soul] discourse accompanied by
knowledge—discourse capable of helping itself as well as the man who planted it, which
is not barren but produces a seed from which more discourse grows…such discourse
makes the seed forever immortal...61
Perhaps this passage more than any other underwrites the idea that the soul must first conceive
διάνοια, and then progress in understanding to νοήσις, in which the soul nourishes within it
ἀγάλματα. The discourse which is not “barren”, as stated above, is that which is διάνοια, while
that which grows from the διάνοια and makes the seed “forever immortal” are ἀγάλματα. As
bridges to the forms—which are outside of space and time—it makes perfect sense that that the
ἀγάλματα too, are immortal, just as is the soul. Moreover, Plato states that “such discourses
should be called his own legitimate children, first the discourse that he may have discovered
already within himself and then its sons and brothers…”62
The idea that the metaphors of the Platonic dialogues are commensurate to one another is
not mere conjecture, but a solidly proven thesis. The διάνοια ἔκγονος τῆς ψυχῆς of the
58
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Theaetetus is commensurate to the fruitful discourse of the Phaedrus—linked by the same
metaphor of children—which is commensurate to the διάνοια of the Republic’s line metaphor,
related not only by the very word choice of Plato, but by their same nature and function in the
soul—as a stepping stone to that state of the soul which nourished ἀγάλματα, which are bridges
to the forms, which, as Reeve so accurately revealed, is “embryonic virtue” in the soul of
Socrates.
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